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Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 25 U.S 245 (1829):  
An Early Test of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
MICHAEL P. COLLINS, JR.*  
 On March 20, 1829, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Willson v. 
Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.1 Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, 
affirmed the judgment of the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware and held that the State 
of Delaware could enact legislation restricting the free navigation of the Blackbird Creek, located 
in New Castle County, Delaware.2 According to the Court, such regulation did not violate Article 
I, Section Eight, of the Constitution of the United States which delegates to Congress the exclusive 
authority to pass legislation regarding commerce “among the several states.”3 Thompson Wilson, 
a sloop operator who could no longer navigate the newly dammed creek, argued that restricting 
navigation in the creek limited his right to captain his sloop pursuant to his federal coasting 
license.4 The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. argued that Delaware could enact legislation regarding 
the waters located completely within the boundaries of the state.5 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author thanks Professor 
Garret Power, Dr. Edward Papenfuse, and Professor Frederick Leiner for their invaluable assistance in researching 
and writing this paper and for their encouraging enthusiasm of legal history. 
 The author transcribed approximately 80 pages of lower court papers, briefs, and opinions submitted to the 
United States Supreme Court during the appellate litigation in 1828 and 1829. During the transcription process, the 
author made very minor adjustments regarding punctuation and spelling to modernize the text for today’s readers. 
Almost all of the lower court documents are hand written in script and therefore, some words are unreadable. In the 
instance of unreadable text the author noted “unreadable” in the transcription. While some of the documents in the 
lower court record are paginated, most lack pagination. For documents without pagination, the author has omitted a 
page number from the citation.  
 Those interested in reviewing or consulting the lower court documents can find them in the microfilm 
collection of the National Archives Research Center located in Washington, D.C. with the following information: 
Dockets of the U.S. Supreme Court 1790-1950, Cabinet 33A, Drawer 02, Docket number 1506; Appellate Case 
Files of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1792-1831, Cabinet 33A, Drawer 01; Minutes of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1790-
1950, Cabinet 33A, Drawer 02.  
1 27 U.S. 245 (1829).  
2 Id. at 252.  
3 Id. at 250–52; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
4 Willson, 27 U.S. at 248–49.  
5 Id. at 249–50.  
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 The Court decided Willson nearly 200 years ago. Despite the passage of almost two 
centuries and ample opportunity for research and discovery, no legal scholar or historian has 
endeavored to explore the facts of the case and the nature of the underlying controversy. Even the 
Court’s opinion, occupying a mere eight pages in the reporter, fails to provide a detailed account 
of the facts of the case.6 This paper sheds some light on the facts which brought Willson to the 
Court.7 Willson represents the Court’s first interpretation of the dormant commerce clause.8 The 
Court’s decision to uphold the Delaware law conflicts, at least to some degree, with the Court’s 
decision in Gibbons v. Ogden and subsequent decisions regarding navigable waters.9 Finally, Mr. 
Wilson likely did not bring a takings claim against Delaware since the Court would not have 
supported such a claim.10  
I. The Case 
 In 1822, the Delaware House of Representatives passed legislation entitled “An Act to 
enable the owners and possessors of the marsh cripple and low grounds, lying upon Black bird-
creek in New Castle County, to bank and drain the same.”11 Through this statute, the Delaware 
general assembly created the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company.12 
 A. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company 
                                                 
6 Id. at 250.  
7 See infra Part I.  
8 See infra Part III.A. 
9 Id.  
10 See infra Part III.B.  
11 46, Del. Laws 206 (1822).  
12 46, Del. Laws § 1 (1822). In the Supreme Court opinion, and in the lower court documents, the marsh company is 
sometime referred to as the “Blackbird Creek Marsh Company,” the “Black-Bird Creek Marsh Company,” and the 
Black Bird Creek Marsh Company.” The law passed by the Delaware General Assembly refers to the company as 
the “Black bird creek marsh company.” The author will refer to the company as either the “marsh company” or the 
“Blackbird Creek Marsh Company.”  
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 Blackbird Creek sits in the southern portion of New Castle County, Delaware. It feeds into 
the Delaware River just before the Delaware Bay. Today, the creek extends approximately 16.9 
miles and flows from East to West.  
 
Figure 1: Map of New Castle County – 1820 13 
                                                 
13 Roads of Newcastle County. Surveyed and Printed by Henry Heald, 1820 (available at 
http://bostonraremaps.com/inventory/antique-map-newcastle-county-delaware-brm2161/).  
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The Delaware legislation created the new marsh company in 1822. According to the 
enabling legislation, “the owners and possessors of the marsh, cripple, and low grounds lying in 
Appoquinimink Hundred, New Castle County,” and “lying upon both sides of Black-bird-creek . 
. . shall compose a company to be called ‘The Black bird creek marsh company.’”14 The act 
authorized the marsh company to bank Blackbird Creek by “making and constructing a suitable 
bank or banks, dam or dams, with the requisite trunks and sluices. . . .”15 The marsh company was 
to hold an annual meeting on the first Monday of March and at this meeting, the owners and 
possessors of the marsh were to choose, by ballot, a treasurer and three managers for the ensuing 
year.16 The act tasked these managers with building and constructing a “good and sufficient dam 
across” the creek at such a place as the managers or a majority of the managers found to be 
sufficient.17 The dam to be constructed was required to be “at least three feet above the common 
tides.”18  
The act also appointed three commissioners to view and examine the marsh so that the 
marsh company could establish a “valuation or rate of assessment to be observed in assessing and 
laying all taxes” under the act.19 In making their assessments, the commissioners were to consider 
who among the landowners surrounding the creek would benefit, and to what degree, from the 
banking and damming of the creek.20 Once the commissioners submitted their valuations of the 
estimated land improvements, cost of constructing the dam would be apportioned according to the 
degree which each land owner benefited from its construction.21 If the landowners failed to pay 
                                                 
14 Id.  
15 Id. According to Merriam-Webster, a sluice is a device for water to flow through with a gate controlling the flow. 
Sluice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sluice.  
16 46, Del. Laws § 2 (1822).  
17 46, Del. Laws § 6 (1822).  
18 Id.  
19 46, Del. Laws § 8 (1822).  
20 Id.  
21 46, Del. Laws § 12 (1822).  
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the annual fee, Delaware could impose interest on the uncollected fee at the rate of fifteen percent 
annually until the fee was paid.22 If a landowner still refused to pay, the state could confiscate and 
then sell the land in order pay the outstanding fee.23  
 The act also imposed a penalty for anyone who damaged or otherwise broke, in any 
manner, the dams, banks, trunks, or sluices constructed pursuant to the act.24 Likewise, the act also 
penalized any effort to “hinder, molest, or disturb, the managers . . . or their workmen while 
employed in making or constructing the aforesaid dam, banks, trunks, or sluices . . . .”25 Each 
person convicted under the act could be fined for every offense up to $2,000.00.26 Half of this fee 
was to be paid to the marsh company, while the other half was to be paid to the state.27 Essentially, 
the act created a private cause of action through which the marsh company could collect 
compensation for any damage to the dam.  
 The final section of the act permits the owners of the land lying above the bank and dam 
to keep “flats or scows to transport their lumber, cord wood, grain and other commodities” down 
the creek.28 Presumably, the legislature included the right to operate scows as a means of protecting 
the landowner’s method of transporting materials along the river even after the marsh company 
                                                 
22 46, Del. Laws § 13 (1822).  
23 Id. It remains unclear exactly why Delaware chose to create a company with the purpose of building the dam 
rather than building the dam with its own resources. Perhaps the state created the company in an effort to more 
easily tax the surrounding landowners. Specifically, enabling the company to manage the collection of the financing 
for the dam likely relieved some of the burden which would have otherwise rested with the state.  
24 46, Del. Laws § 19 (1822).  
25 Id.  
26 Id.; $2,000.00 in 1822 equals approximately $40,000 in 2016. Oregon State University, Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) Conversion Factors for Years 1774 to Estimated 2026 to Convert to ESTIMATED Dollars of 2016 (2016), 
http://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/sites/liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/files/polisci/faculty-research/sahr/inflation-
conversion/pdf/cv2016.pdf.  
27 46, Del. Laws § 19 (1822).  
28 46, Del. Laws § 22 (1822). A scow is a large flat-bottomed boat with broad square ends used chiefly for 
transporting bulk material. Scow, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scow. A scow 
differed from a sloop in that it drew significantly less water and therefore could operate in shallower waters.  
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had constructed the bank and dam. The act specifically mentions that the landowners shall have 
“free egress and regress up and down [Blackbird Creek].”29  
 B. Thompson Willson and Others30  
 Thompson Wilson held a federal license 
to carry on the coasting trade in the waters of the 
United States.31 According to the lower court 
documents, Mr. Wilson was licensed to operate 
a sloop called the Sarah.32 He was licensed per 
the federal Coasting Act of 1793 which licensed 
vessels to carry on trade between the several 
states and in the waters of the United States.33 
According to the coasting license, Mr. Wilson 
was a mariner living in Blackbird, New Castle 
County, Delaware.34 Together with Mr. Charles 
Smith, also of Blackbird, Mr. Wilson operated 
the Sarah, a sloop built at Mantua Creek, 
Gloucester County, New Jersey.35 The ship was 
built in 1803 and measured forty-eight feet long, 
                                                 
29 46, Del. Laws § 22 (1822).  
30 Although the official record from the Supreme Court and the Court’s opinion spell his name “Thompson Willson” 
many of the lower court papers, including his coasting license, spell his name as “Thompson Wilson.” For purposes 
of this paper the author will refer to the defendant, and later the appellant, as Thompson Wilson. 
31 Answer, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).  
32 Id. The Supreme Court would subsequently refer to Thompson Wilson’s ship as the Sally. Willson v. The Black-
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 246 (1829).  
33 An Act for Enrolling and Licensing Ships or Vessels to Be Employed in the Coasting Trade and Fisheries, and for 
Regulating the Same, Pub. L. 2-8, Feb. 18, 1793. 
34 Answer, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).  
35 Id.  
Figure 2: Thompson Wilson's Coasting License 
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sixteen feet wide, drew four and a half feet, and was “flat built.”36 The license authorized Mr. 
Wilson to operate the sloop in the coasting trade through March 3, 1824, at which time his license 
would require renewal.37  
In the lower court documents and pleadings, several other individuals are mentioned as 
affiliates of Mr. Wilson. The list of Mr. Wilson’s compatriots is inconsistent and often, the names 
are indecipherable. Throughout the litigation—and all the way to the Supreme Court of the United 
States—Mr. Wilson is mentioned as the primary litigant.  
Mr. Wilson probably depended, in large part, on his coasting license so that he could move 
goods, either for himself, or at the request of others. From 1810 to 1820, the population of the 
United States expanded by more than 33% to nearly ten million people by 1820.38 By 1822, 
American commerce continued to increase yet there were very few roads.39 As a result, maritime 
commerce remained the most cost effective means of transporting goods throughout the country.40  
 C. Breaking the Banks and Dam 
 On January 27, 1824, the Delaware General Assembly repealed much of the statute 
enabling the marsh company to bank and dam Blackbird Creek.41 The new statute stated that, the 
enabling act, which empowered and authorized the owners and possessors of the marsh “to stop 
or obstruct the free navigation of the Black-bird creek, be and the same is hereby repealed and 
                                                 
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., State of New Jersey, United States Resident Population by State: 1790-1850, 
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/census/1990/poptrd1.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).  
39 GEORGE R. TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION: 1815–1860, at 133 (1951).  
40 Id.  
41 A Supplement to the Act Entitled “An Act to Enable the Owners and Possessors of the Marsh Cripple and Low 
Grounds Lying upon Black-bird creek, in Newcastle County, to Bank and Drain the Same.” 48, Del. Laws § 1 
(1824). The act fails to mention any reason as to why the legislature sought to repeal the marsh company’s enabling 
legislation. Perhaps the land owners surrounding Blackbird Creek grew frustrated with the marsh company’s efforts 
or felt that the company profited at the landowners’ expense. At the Supreme Court, Mr. Wilson’s lawyer would 
argue that the marsh company existed only for “private emolument.” Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 
U.S. 245, 248 (1829).  
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declared null and void.”42 The statute still permitted the marsh company to construct a bank or 
dam, but not to the extent that such construction would obstruct or stop the creek or injure the 
navigation of the same.43 Finally, the amended statute prohibited the imposition of any penalty for 
breaking or otherwise damaging a bank or dam which injured the free navigation of Blackbird 
Creek.44 Put another way, it was no longer illegal to break or destroy the dam if it prevented free 
passage along the creek. 
On April 1, 1824, the marsh company filed a complaint in Delaware alleging that 
Thompson Wilson and several other men destroyed a portion of the dam at Blackbird Creek.45 
Specifically, the complaint alleged that at some point prior to April 1, 1824 (the date is left blank), 
Thompson Wilson and others “with force and arms, to wit, guns, pistols, hatchets, axes, spades, 
shovels, mattocks, and other iron instruments . . . did break, damage and destroy the said banks 
and dam made of mud gum piles and plank.”46 The marsh company brought an action against 
Thompson Wilson for trespass vi et armis—or by force and arms—for the destruction of its 
property in Blackbird Creek.47 The marsh company sued for $20,000 in damages—what would be 
approximately $500,000.00 in 2016.48 
The actual date of the dam’s destruction remains unclear. The lower court papers reveal 
that the court issued an order to the sheriff for the arrest of Thompson Wilson and several others 
on November 8, 1823.49 If the dam had already been torn out by November 1823, Thompson 
                                                 
42 Id. (emphasis added). 
43 48, Del. Laws § 2 (1824). 
44 48, Del. Laws § 3 (1824). 
45 Complaint, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.; Oregon State University, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors for Years 1774 to Estimated 2026 
to Convert to ESTIMATED Dollars of 2016 (2016), 
http://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/sites/liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/files/polisci/faculty-research/sahr/inflation-
conversion/pdf/cv2016.pdf.  
49 Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1823).  
10 
 
Wilson would have acted long before the marsh company’s enabling legislation had been repealed. 
The sheriff took Mr. Wilson into custody, but he would be released by February 19, 1824.50 The 
trial court proceeding was scheduled for the March term in 1824.51  
 At the trial court, James Rogers, the Attorney General of Delaware, represented the marsh 
company.52 James Rogers served as the Attorney General of Delaware from 1815 until 1830.53 
George Read, Jr. represented Mr. Thompson Wilson.54  
D. The Trial Court and Subsequent Appeals  
 At the trial court, Mr. Wilson mounted several defenses. First, Mr. Wilson argued that the 
place of his alleged trespass, Blackbird Creek, was “a public and common navigable Creek in the 
nature of a highway in which the tides and waters . . . have flowed and reflowed.”55 Essentially, 
the marsh company had no right to stop the free navigation of a creek which ebbs and flows with 
the tide and is in the nature of a public thoroughfare. Without pulling up the gum piles and planks, 
wrongfully placed in the creek, Mr. Wilson and his fellow citizens could no longer freely navigate 
Blackbird Creek.56  
Second, he argued that the company no longer had any right to stop the free navigation of 
Blackbird Creek since Delaware repealed, in large part, the enabling act of the marsh company in 
January 1824.57 Specifically, the legislature repealed every provision of the act which had 
previously imposed a penalty, fine, or punishment, upon anyone who cut or destroyed any bank, 
                                                 
50 Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).  
51 Id.  
52 Complaint, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).  
53 Delaware Dep’t. of Justice, About the Office, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/executive/about.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2016).  
54 Answer, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824). For a more detailed description of Mr. Read, 
please see the biographical appendix.  
55 Answer, Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
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dam, or obstruction erected across or in Blackbird Creek.58 The mud and gum piles in Blackbird 
Creek were wrongfully there since the statute now prohibited any obstruction to the free navigation 
of the creek.59 To remove these obstructions, Thompson Wilson removed the mud and gum piles 
so that citizens could freely navigate the creek thereafter.60 
Third, and finally, Mr. Wilson argued that, since the creek was a navigable and public 
highway, the landowners surrounding the creek were entitled to “reasonable wharfage.”61 Even if 
the creek was not open to everyone, at least those individuals with land lying along the creek should 
be permitted to use the creek for access to their lands62 
On April 3, 1824, the trial court heard demurrers from both the marsh company and Mr. 
Wilson.63 After hearing the arguments, the trial court found in favor of Mr. Wilson and dismissed 
the claims of the marsh company.64 The marsh company appealed immediately.65 
On June 20, 1825, the High Court of Errors and Appeals found in favor of the marsh 
company.66 The appellate court reviewed the trial court record and reversed and annulled the lower 
judgment.67 The appellate court directed the trial court to convict Mr. Wilson of trespass, and to 
award damages to the marsh company.68 The appellate court also directed the trial court to conduct 
further fact finding regarding the amount of damages to be awarded to the marsh company.69  
                                                 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1824).  
64 Id.  
65 Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1825).  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
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On November 2, 1825, the trial court impaneled a jury to consider the issue of damages.70 
After hearing the evidence presented—and instructions that Thompson Wilson was already found 
to have trespassed—the jury awarded damages to the marsh company in the amount of $650.00.71 
On December 2, 1825, the court issued an order fieri facias for the collection of the outstanding 
damages owed by Thompson Wilson.72 Fieri facias is an order for the sheriff to collect, seize, and 
then sell a debtor’s property to satisfy a money judgment.73 The Sheriff would later write to the 
court that only the property of Mr. Wilson could be found and annexed.74  
On June 19, 1826, Mr. Wilson appealed to the High Court of Errors and Appeals.75 He 
alleged again that there was no trespass upon the marsh company and that, in the alternative, the 
damages awarded by the jury were much greater than properly warranted.76 On June 29, 1826, the 
High Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court with costs to Mr. 
Wilson.77 The appellate court did not issue an opinion, and simply affirmed the lower judgment.78 
On June 6, 1827, the marsh company received an order to appear before the Supreme Court 
of the United States.79 Mr. Wilson decided to take his case all the way to the Court in an effort to 
                                                 
70 Id.  
71 Id. $650.00 in 1825 equals approximately $15,800.00 in 2016. Oregon State University, Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) Conversion Factors for Years 1774 to Estimated 2026 to Convert to ESTIMATED Dollars of 2016 (2016), 
http://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/sites/liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/files/polisci/faculty-research/sahr/inflation-
conversion/pdf/cv2016.pdf.  
72 Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1825).  
73 Fieri Facias, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); See also 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of 
Judgments § 14, at 50–51 (1994) (“The writ of ‘fieri facias’ . . . was an early common-law means of enforcing 
payment on a judgment; it was, in effect, an order to the sheriff of the court to enforce a judgment against the debtor 
by levy, seizure, and sale of his personalty to the extent needed to satisfy a judgment.”).  
74 Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. v. Thompson Wilson (1825). As to the other persons involved in the case (which the 
author has not mentioned due to their irrelevance to the case at hand) the sheriff wrote that he could not find any of 
Mr. Wilson’s co-conspirators, and therefore failed to collect any other property. Id.  
75 Thompson Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1826).  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Thompson Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1827).  
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affirm his right to freely navigate Blackbird Creek. The Court received the lower court record on 
February 13, 1828.80  
 
II. The Court’s Reasoning  
 
Figure 3: Minutes of the Supreme Court – March 17, 1829  
The Court heard arguments in the case of Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Company on 
March 17, 1829.81 In Willson, the Supreme Court, via a unanimous decision, affirmed the 
judgement of the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware and held that Delaware could 
authorize a company to obstruct the free flow of waters completely within the state.82 While Chief 
Justice Marshall authored the only opinion in the case, his decision can be divided into two 
sections. The first section of the opinion discusses whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the 
case.83 The second section of the opinion discusses, in an even shorter analysis than that 
accompanying the issue of jurisdiction, the merits of the parties’ claims on the constitutional 
                                                 
80 Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., No. 1506 (1828).  
81 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829).  
82 Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 247–50 (1829).  
83 See infra Part III.A.  
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issue.84 As was customary of Supreme Court opinions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, the reporter included a summary of the arguments for each of the parties regarding both 
the jurisdictional and constitutional issues.85 William Wirt argued on behalf of the marsh 
company.86 Richard S. Coxe argued on behalf of Thompson Willson.87 
 A. Jurisdiction 
 Before moving to a decision on the merits—that is, the constitutional issue regarding 
whether Delaware could impede the free navigation Blackbird Creek—the Court first considered 
whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case.88 
 1. The Arguments 
 On the issue of jurisdiction, Mr. Coxe argued on behalf of Thompson Wilson that the 
Supreme Court could hear the case pursuant to section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act of 1789.89 
Mr. Coxe argued that the highest court of Delaware, the High Court of Errors and Appeals, had 
considered the issue of the act’s constitutionality in rendering its affirmation of the award of 
damages from the lower court.90 The only way by which the High court of Errors and Appeals 
                                                 
84 See infra Part III.B.  
85 Willson, 27 U.S. at 247–50.  
86 For more information regarding Mr. Wirt, see the biographical appendix.  
87 The Supreme Court opinion mentions only that “Mr. Coxe” argued on behalf of Thompson Wilson. According to 
the Attorney Rolls of the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Richard S. Coxe was admitted to practice before 
the Court on February 4, 1823. John D. Coxe was also admitted to practice on August 1, 1791. Given the dates of 
each lawyer’s respective admission, it seems likely that Richard S. Coxe served as counsel for Mr. Wilson.  
88 Willson, 27 U.S. at 250–51.  
89 Id. at 247–48. Section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act of 1789 reads, in relevant part:  
That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which 
a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, 
or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where 
is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the 
ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the 
decision is in favour of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any 
clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, 
and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either 
party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined 
and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error . . . . 
Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. 1-20, Sept. 24, 1789, § 25 (emphasis added).  
90 Willson, 27 U.S. at 247–48.  
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could have affirmed the lower court decision would have been to uphold the act authorizing the 
marsh company to bank and dam Blackbird Creek.91 
 Mr. Wirt, arguing on behalf of the marsh company, asserted that the record failed to present 
a case in which the Court had jurisdiction.92 The courts of Delaware might have decided for the 
marsh company “without sustaining the constitutionality of the act of incorporation . . . .”93 Mr. 
Wirt cited the case of Mathews v. Zane for the proposition that the Court should not find 
jurisdiction unless the issue of constitutionality arose “inevitably”.94 In actuality, Mathews v. Zane 
did not squarely support Mr. Wirt, but did interpret the Judiciary Act of 1789 as subservient to the 
jurisdictional restrictions of the Constitution.95  
 2. The Decision 
Ultimately, Chief Justice Marshall agreed with Mr. Coxe and found that the Court did in 
fact have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the claims.96 “Undoubtedly,” he wrote “the plea might 
have stated in terms that the act, so far as it authorized a dam across the creek, was repugnant to 
the Constitution of the United States . . . .”97 The marsh company relied exclusively on its 
legislative authority to build a dam across Blackbird Creek; the marsh company did not argue that 
it had a private right to obstruct the creek.98 Since the marsh company did not rely on any other 
right, outside of the legislative authorization, the state courts must have considered the 
                                                 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 249.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. (citing Mathews v. Zane, 20 U.S. 164 (1822)).  
95 Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. 164, 206 (1822). 
96 Willson, 27 U.S. at 250.  
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
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constitutionality of the act.99 The act’s “consistency with, or repugnancy to the constitution of the 
United States necessarily arises upon these pleadings, and must have been determined.”100 
To be sure, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the Court had decided in favor of jurisdiction 
in at least three similar cases. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Supreme Court announced that the 
Court could review state court decisions and that federal review could override a state judgment 
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.101 Likewise, in Miller v. Nicholls, the Court 
upheld jurisdiction where the facts giving the Court jurisdiction appear on the record or could be 
necessarily implied therefrom.102 In Williams v. Norris, the Court found jurisdiction even where 
the record did not reveal that the constitutionality of the act was drawn into question.103 All of 
these cases allowed Chief Justice Marshall to conclude that it is not necessary to state in terms on 
the record “that the constitution or a law of the United States was drawn into question.”104 
B. The Merits  
After establishing the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, Chief Justice Marshall then 
moved to a consideration of the merits.105 Specifically, the Court considered whether Delaware 
could pass a statute which infringed the free navigation of a public creek, and whether such a law 
would conflict with the Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate commerce between the states.  
1. The Arguments 
Mr. Coxe argued on behalf of Thompson Wilson that the act of the Delaware legislature 
violated the Constitution and principles of common law.106 The judgement of the High Court of 
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Errors and Appeals was erroneous, “because the act . . . so far as the same authorized the company 
to shut up and embank across a navigable stream, below the ebb and flow of the tide is repugnant 
to the Constitution of the United States . . . .”107 Blackbird Creek is a navigable river and rights to 
its navigation belong to all citizens of the United States.108 Furthermore, the right to use a navigable 
stream is jus publicum—a right of the public.109 Anticipating or responding to an argument from 
Mr. Wirt, Mr. Coxe explained that the enabling act by the Delaware legislature did not aim to 
improve the lives of Delawareans, but instead allowed the operators of the marsh company to 
enrich themselves through the construction and operation of the dam and bank.110  
Mr. Coxe, relied extensively on the Court’s decision in Gibbons v. Ogden.111 Just as the 
Court prevented New York from restricting a particular vessel from the waters between New York 
and New Jersey, here too, the Court should not allow Delaware to stop the navigation of a creek.112 
Thompson Wilson’s sloop was, in fact, licensed to carry on the coasting trade, just as Gibbons was 
licensed to operate his steamboat.113 Both Wilson and Gibbons were licensed according to the 
Coasting Act of 1793.114 If in Gibbons, New York could not prohibit the exercise of a right granted 
by a federal license, here too, Delaware could not prohibit the free navigation of Blackbird 
Creek.115  
Mr. Coxe also argued that the act of the legislature, in 1824, repealed the incorporating 
legislation and prohibited the marsh company from constructing any obstruction in Blackbird 
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108 Id. at 248.  
109 Id. at 248.  
110 Id. (“The statute of Delaware does not look to the preservation of the health of the citizens of the state, but to 
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Creek.116 The repeal of the enabling act could have presented the Court with an opportunity to find 
that, regardless of the constitutional issue in the case, the marsh company no longer had statutory 
authority to bank or dam the creek.117 Rather than considering this issue, Chief Justice Marshall 
omitted all argument with regard to the act’s repeal and did not discuss the issue further.118 
Mr. Wirt admitted that Blackbird Creek is navigable and in the nature of a public 
highway.119 Despite the navigability and public nature of Blackbird Creek, it rests entirely within 
the boundaries of the state of Delaware.120 How could the Court hold that a state lacked the 
constitutional authority to regulate subjects entirely within its geographic boundaries? Surely, Mr. 
Wirt argued, it “cannot be urged that the power to regulate commerce can interfere with the rights 
of the states over the property within their boundaries.”121 He emphasized that Delaware had 
merely exercised its state police powers: “While the waters of the United States belong to the 
whole people of the nation, this creek continued subject to the power of the state in whose territory 
it rises.”122 He went to great lengths to explain that Blackbird Creek is “one of those sluggish 
reptile streams” which “spreads its venom and destroys the health of all those who inhabit its 
marshes.”123 
The power to regulate commerce pursuant to Article One, Section Eight of the constitution 
could not be construed to interfere, to such a great extent, with state police powers.124 Furthermore, 
if it could be so construed, there was no federal right with which the Delaware law interfered.125 
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Put another way, despite the fact that Mr. Wilson was licensed to carry on the coasting trade by a 
federal statute, Mr. Wirt argued that there had been no legislation by Congress with which the 
Delaware legislation interfered.126  
2. The Decision 
 Having established that the Court could hear the case, and considering the arguments of 
the litigants, Chief Justice Marshall turned to “the more doubtful question” of “whether the act 
incorporating the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company is repugnant to the Constitution, so far as it 
authorizes a dam across the creek.”127 Chief Justice Marshall found some merit in Mr. Wirt’s 
argument regarding the negative impacts of Blackbird Creek prior to the legislature’s passage of 
the enabling act.128 He explained “this is one of those many creeks, passing through a deep level 
marsh adjoining the Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance.”129 He agreed that the 
value of the property along the banks of Blackbird Creek must have been enhanced by draining 
the same.130 He also noted that the lives and health of those who reside beside and near the creek 
were probably improved greatly.131 
 Even if the act of the Delaware legislature vastly increased the value of property situated 
along the creek and improved the lives of the Delawareans living there, the act would still be 
unconstitutional if it interfered with a federal statute or right.132 At this point, Mr. Wilson might 
have thought the he was about to prevail in the case and succeed in overturning the decision of the 
High Court of Errors and Appeals. Alas, his hopes were dashed when Chief Justice Marshall went 
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on to explain that Delaware interfered with no such right.133 Mr. Wilson’s argument regarding the 
Delaware law rested entirely on its “repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations and among the several states.”134 Such an objection could only be valid if Congress had 
taken some kind of legislative action regarding Blackbird Creek.135 According to the Court, 
Congress had passed no legislation regarding the creek and therefore Delaware was completely 
within its right to take legislative action regarding its improvement.136 Chief Justice Marshall cited 
no precedent to support his holding regarding the commerce clause holding. He closed the opinion 
by summarizing, “We do not think that the act empowering the [marsh company] to place a dam 
across the creek, can . . . be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its 
dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”137 
 The Court held that there was no error and affirmed the judgment of the High Court of 
Errors and Appeals with costs.138 
IV. Analysis  
Article I, Section Eight, of the Constitution empowers Congress to “regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”139 In Gibbons 
v. Ogden, the Court determined that Congress had exclusive authority to regulate commerce 
between the states.140 Willson represents the first decision to interpret what has since been 
recognized as the dormant commerce clause.141 In addition, the jurisprudence of the early 
nineteenth century indicates that the Congress possessed the exclusive power to regulate all 
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navigable waters in the United States.142 In this context, Willson represents a decision inconsistent 
with the Court’s later cases which would hold that Congress possessed exclusive regulatory power 
in navigable waterways.143  
 Aside from a commerce clause challenge, one might ask why Thompson Wilson did not 
argue, at any stage in the litigation, that the Delaware legislation amounted to a taking of his 
coasting license. The answer to this question lies in the fact that, at the time, the Court had decided 
very few cases regarding the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The Court’s decision in Barron 
v. Baltimore, which came after Willson, held the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal 
government—meaning that citizens could not assert a Fifth Amendment takings claim against a 
state government. The lack of Supreme Court precedent regarding takings, and the generally 
accepted belief that the rights protected in the Bill of Rights applied only to the national 
government, and not the individual states, likely dissuaded Mr. Wilson’s lawyers from claiming a 
taking.144 Even if Mr. Wilson brought a takings claim according to modern jurisprudence, his claim 
would still fail since the value of his coasting license was not completely eliminated by the 
Delaware law.145 
A. The Court Applied the Dormant Commerce Clause While Ignoring the Navigability 
of Blackbird Creek.  
 In response to one of the several failures of the Articles of Confederation, many of the 
delegates of the Constitutional Convention recognized the need for the federal Congress to regulate 
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commerce not only with foreign nations, but also between the several states.146 For this reason, the 
new federal Constitution empowered Congress to pass laws regarding trade between the states.147  
 In the seminal case of Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court struck down a New York law which 
granted an exclusive steamboat monopoly in the waters between New York and New Jersey.148 In 
1809, New York granted Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton exclusive authority to operate 
steamboats in the waters of New York for twenty years.149 Aaron Ogden eventually obtained the 
rights to the monopoly and attempted to enforce the state-created monopoly against his former 
business partner, Thomas Gibbons.150 Ultimately, the Court decided that New York could not 
create such a monopoly on the steamboat business in New York waters.151 Specifically, the Court 
held that “commerce”, as used in Article I, Section Eight, included navigation of waterways.152 
Congress, according to Chief Justice Marshall, had the exclusive authority to regulate commerce 
between the states.153 In his explanation of the commerce power granted to Congress in Article I, 
Section Eight, Chief Justice Marshall wrote one sentence which made Gibbons the first case to 
recognize the dormant commerce clause:  
The grant [of the power to regulate commerce] does not convey power 
which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which 
can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power 
for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; 
which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be 
placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant.154 
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In this way, Chief Justice Marshall explained that the exclusive power of Congress to regulate 
commerce between the states necessarily implied that the states themselves did not possess power 
to regulate, and therefore impede commerce between the states.155  
 
Figure 4: The Port of New York156 
 In Willson, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that Thompson Wilson challenged the 
Delaware law as a violation of the dormant commerce clause. For this reason, in an already very 
short opinion, the Chief Justice explained that the Court’s decision did not offend the dormant 
commerce clause:  
We do not think that the [Delaware] act empowering the Black Bird Creek 
Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek, can, under all the 
circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to 
regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law 
passed on the subject.157 
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According to the Court, the marsh company’s enabling act was not an awakening of the dormant 
commerce clause which would have caused the state action to conflict with the exclusive authority 
of Congress. Following the Court’s decision in Gibbons, the decision in Willson might have come 
as a surprise. In Gibbons, the Court struck down a state regulation which impeded the free flow of 
navigation and therefore commerce. Yet, in Willson, the Court found no problem with a state 
regulation which prohibited Thompson Wilson from navigating Blackbird Creek. Thompson 
Wilson and Thomas Gibbons both challenged the state restrictions on the basis that the restrictions 
conflict with the rights granted to them by the Coasting Act. Rather the considering the issue of 
the coasting license, Chief Justice Marshall flatly ignored the issue.158  
Gibbons and Willson were different in at least two ways which might explain the 
divergence in outcomes. First, the regulation in Gibbons was purely of a commercial nature.159 
New York sought to exclude all other steamboat operators for the economic advantage of the 
state’s exclusive licensee.160 In Willson though, the Delaware legislature allegedly aimed to bank 
or dam Blackbird Creek to improve the lives of the citizens living nearby.161 Second, the port of 
New York (at issue in Gibbons), it can be safely assumed, was far busier and hosted many more 
vessels than Blackbird Creek. These two factors, the economic nature of the legislation, and the 
nature of the waterways involved, have been offered as possible differentiations which might 
explain why the Court inconsistently decided Gibbons and Willson.162  
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After Willson, the Court cited the case to uphold state regulations which could have been 
viewed as impediments to commerce between the states. For example, in Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens of Philadelphia, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania law which required all ships entering 
the port of Philadelphia to hire a local pilot for the vessel.163 The Court held that the law did not 
infringe upon the authority granted to Congress since Congress, although having authority to pass 
laws concerning pilotage, had not passed a law regarding pilotage in Philadelphia.164 Pennsylvania 
did not offend the Constitution since Congress was silent on the subject.165 The Court cited Willson 
for the proposition that in the absence of congressional legislation, states may act to regulate 
commerce.166 Today, Willson has yet to be expressly overturned or questioned by any Supreme 
Court decision.  
 
Figure 5: The Port of Philadelphia167 
 
                                                 
York merely exercised state power in an effort to create a monopoly—with no real advantage to the citizens of the 
state—Delaware acted to dam the creek in an effort to prevent the spread of its “venom” as referenced in the 
Supreme Court opinion. The Court, in approving state action in Willson likely did so more as an approval of 
Delaware’s state police powers.  
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(available at http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/pga.04343/).  
26 
 
 Willson further conflicts with the Court’s subsequent decisions regarding state regulations 
which impede the navigation of rivers. After Willson, the Court routinely held that Congress 
possessed the sole authority to regulate the navigable waters of the United States.168 The Court 
clearly stated in Gilman and Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. that Congress had the exclusive 
authority to pass all laws regarding the navigation of the waters of the United States. If Blackbird 
Creek was a navigable river, this would seem to render Willson inconsistent with these later cases. 
In this sense, Gilman and Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. at least partially overruled, sub silento, 
the rationale employed by the Court in Willson.  
B. The Delaware Legislation Did not Constitute a Taking in 1829, or Today.  
 In 1824, at least one Delaware representative, in advocating for the repeal of the marsh 
company’s enabling legislation, argued that the legislation, amounted to a taking in that it 
prohibited the free navigation of Blackbird Creek.169 More specifically, the opponent argued that 
Mr. Wilson and others like him, previously had a right to travel up and down Blackbird Creek.170 
Now, with the passage of the enabling act and the subsequent construction of the banks and dam, 
Mr. Wilson had suffered a form of taking—his coasting was now worth considerably less since he 
could not navigate the creek.171 
 Since at least one representative argued that the regulation, preventing the free navigation 
of Blackbird creek amounted to a taking, one might ask why Mr. Wilson did not bring such a claim 
when he sued the marsh company. Mr. Wilson likely did not bring a takings claim since the Court 
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had not yet applied the Fifth Amendment to the states.172 Specifically, the rights enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights applied, according to the Court at that time, only to the federal government.173 In 
1833, the Court heard the case of Barron v. Baltimore.174 In Barron, the Court considered whether 
a wharf owner could bring a takings claim, under the Fifth Amendment, against Baltimore and 
Maryland after the wharf’s value was reduced as a result of a municipal plan to improve drainage 
in Baltimore.175 The Court held that the Fifth Amendment applies only to actions by the federal 
government.176 Chief Justice Marshall explained that the states could pass their own constitutional 
measures requiring just compensation after a taking.177 The federal Constitution imposed the 
requirement of just compensation upon the federal government alone.178 The Fifth Amendment 
would not be applied to the states until the end of the nineteenth century.179 Quite simply, Mr. 
Wilson’s lawyers likely believed that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to state actions which 
would therefore prohibit Mr. Wilson’s claim from succeeding.  
Even today, the Delaware legislation would not amount to a taking which requires just 
compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.180 In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. 
v. City of Chicago,181 the Court incorporated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment into the 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and required states to provide just 
compensation after seizing private property for public use.182 According to the Court’s modern 
taking’s jurisprudence, a regulatory taking occurs when some form of government action, not 
necessarily the exercise of eminent domain authority, significantly reduces property rights.183 
Under the modern doctrine, Mr. Wilson would have a significantly better chance of challenging 
the Delaware legislation, but his takings claims would still fail since the value of his coasting 
license was not reduced to zero.  
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
form the bedrock of American takings jurisprudence.184 Essentially, these decisions, both of which 
relate to land, require that states must compensate property owners after the passage of regulations 
of a certain character.185 While states possess the power to regulate property, when a regulation 
“goes too far,” the regulation amounts to a taking which entitles the property owner to just 
compensation.186 
For example, in Mahon, the Court held that a Pennsylvania regulation amounted to a taking 
for the owners of coal mines.187 The statute at issue prohibited coal companies from mining the 
coal columns left in mines to prevent mine collapses.188 Not only did these columns prevent the 
collapse of the mines, but it also prevented the land above the mine, which was often developed 
with residential or commercial property, from collapsing into the ground.189 The Court held that, 
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since the statute eliminated any interest in the columns, which the coal companies previously held, 
the regulation amounted to a taking.190 In Mahon, the Court held that the regulation “went too far,” 
and therefore worked a taking on the owners of the coal mine.191 
In Penn Central, the Court upheld New York’s efforts to protect historical buildings in 
New York City.192 The regulation created a system which prohibited certain property owners from 
further developing properties, but enabled them to transfer these development rights to neighboring 
properties.193 The Court held that the regulation did not amount to a taking since the development 
rights were not abrogated, but simply made transferrable.194  
If the Court were to apply Mahon to Mr. Wilson’s case, it would likely find that, unlike the 
coal owners in Mahon, Mr. Wilson did not suffer a complete taking of any property. In Mahon, 
the court focused on the fact that the regulation amounted to a complete restriction on the mining 
of the coal columns, making them essentially worthless.195 But, Mr. Wilson did not suffer a 
complete taking of his coasting license. Unlike the coal companies, who could not mine any more 
of their coal, Mr. Wilson could still operate his coasting vessel anywhere in the United States, with 
the exception of the Blackbird Creek. Just as the landowners in Penn Central could transfer 
development rights, Mr. Wilson could navigate in any other waterway in the United States.196 
Therefore, the Court would not find that the Delaware regulation “went too far” by working a 
taking on Mr. Wilson.  
IV. Conclusion  
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 In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., the Supreme Court held that a Delaware law 
permitting the construction of a dam along Blackbird Creek in New Castle, Delaware did not 
conflict with the exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce and therefore, navigation 
between the states.197 Willson represents the Court’s first interpretation of the dormant commerce 
clause.198 While the facts of Willson might seem similar to the facts of Gibbons v. Ogden,199 Chief 
Justice Marshall likely reached a different conclusion in Willson due to the economic and 
geographic differences of the two cases.200 Additionally, the Court’s decision would later conflict 
with subsequent cases concerning navigation of the waters of the United States, and the exclusive 
authority of Congress to regulate such waters.201 Finally, Mr. Wilson likely chose not to bring a 
takings claim—alleging a reduction in the value of his coasting license—since the jurisprudence 
of the time would not have supported such a claim.202 Even today, Mr. Wilson did not suffer a 
taking as a result of the Delaware law.203  
   
                                                 
197 25 U.S. 245 (1829).  
198 See supra Part III.A.  
199 Id.  
200 Id. 
201 Id.  
202 See supra Part III.B.  
203 Id. 
31 
 
Appendix I: George Read, Jr. – A Biographical Sketch 
 
Figure 6: George Read, I204   Figure 7: George Read, Jr.205 
George Read, Jr. was born in New Castle County, Delaware to George and Gertrude (Ross) 
Read in 1765.206 He studied law with his father, George Read, and ultimately became a powerful 
and respected jurist in Delaware.207 George Read signed the Declaration of Independence and 
penned a letter to King George III, while serving as Attorney General of Delaware, scolding the 
King for taxing the colonists while not allowing them representation in Parliament.208 Read also 
assisted in framing the United States Constitution, advocated for its ratification in Delaware, and 
ultimately signed the Constitution in 1789.209  
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On October 30, 1786, George Read, Jr. married his first cousin, Mary Thompson.210 He 
served as the first United States Attorney for the District of Delaware from 1789 until his 
resignation in 1816.211 Upon his resignation in 1816, his son, George Read, III served as the next 
United States attorney.212 In 1820, Attorney General William Wirt requested that George Read, 
along with fellow Delawarean Caesar Rodney, prepare a report regarding a disputed island in the 
Delaware River.213 Along with Caesar Rodney, George Read offered his opinion regarding the 
history of an island in the Delaware River known as the Pea Patch.214 Perhaps Thompson Wilson 
felt George Read was uniquely qualified to assist in his case since George Read likely handled 
several issues involving property rights and even constitutional questions upon leaving his post as 
U.S. Attorney in 1816. 
Beginning in 1797, George Read began construction of a grand mansion and garden in 
New Castle, Delaware.215 Construction of the house finished in 1803.216 The house is 14,000 
square feet and has twenty-two rooms.217 In 1824, a large fire destroyed much of the Read House, 
but before his death in 1836, George Read, Jr. purchased land adjoining the property which allowed 
for the expansion of the Read House & Gardens.218 Today, the house is a historical site in Delaware 
and welcomes visitors every year.219 
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Figure 8: Read House220 
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Appendix II: William Wirt – A Biographical Sketch 
 
Figure 9: William Wirt221 
 William Wirt was the ninth United States Attorney General.222 Wirt served in this capacity 
from November 13, 1817 until March 4, 1829.223 
 Wirt was born in Bladensburg, Maryland on November 8, 1772.224 In 1807, 
President Thomas Jefferson appointed him to prosecute Aaron Burr for charges of treason.225 
Later, in 1817, President James Monroe appointed Wirt Attorney General. While serving as 
Attorney General, Wirt argued many cases before the Supreme Court, to include McCulloch v. 
                                                 
221 Charles Balthazar Julien Fevret de Saint Mémin, William Wirt, head-and-shoulders portrait, facing left (1807) 
(available at http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/97514239/).  
222 Attorney General: William Wirt, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/wirt-
william (last visited November 22, 2016).  
223 Id.  
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Maryland226 and Gibbons v. Ogden.227 William Wirt also served as the Supreme Court counsel for 
the marsh company in 1829. Recognized as one of the greatest lawyers to ever appear before the 
Court, Wirt dedicated his life to his work.228  
In Gibbons, Wirt argued on behalf of Thomas Gibbons.229 Thomas Gibbons, as previously 
discussed, sought to prevent the enforcement of the steamboat monopoly granted by New York to 
his former business partner, Aaron Ogden.230 Mr. Wirt’s argument in the case was spectacular:  
 Those who have witnessed Mr. Wirt’s oratorical efforts, will testify 
to the difficulty of ever furnishing an exact report, even by himself, 
of the finest passages in which his taste often led him to indulge. He 
was in the habit often of turning aside from the direct path of 
argument, to amuse himself and his hearers with an occasional 
gambol of wit or fancy, which came with most graceful playfulness 
to relieve the stress and weariness of mere dialects.231  
 
 In would appear somewhat inconsistent for Mr. Wirt to argue on behalf of a mariner trying 
to escape the grip of a state regulation (Gibbons) while later arguing on behalf a company hoping 
to enforce a state law (the marsh company). Wirt’s ability to prevail in each case, achieving a 
victory for both Ogden and the marsh company, is a lasting testament to his ability to persuade the 
learned justices of the Supreme Court, and especially Chief Justice John Marshall.  
                                                 
226 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  
227 22 U.S. 1 (1824).  
228 2 JOHN PENDLETON KENNEDY, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM WIRT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED 
STATES 162–63 (1849) (“He was at this period of his life employed in the greater number of the most important 
cases in the Supreme Court. He was also deeply immersed in the practice of the courts of Baltimore and 
Annapolis”).  
229 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).  
230 Id.  
231 KENNEDY, supra 163.  
